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How stable are human aesthetic preferences, and how does stability change over the
lifespan? Here we investigate the stability of aesthetic taste in a cross-sectional study. We
employed a simple rank-order preference task using paintings and photographs of faces
and landscapes. In each of the four stimulus classes, we find that aesthetic stability
generally follows an inverted U-shaped function, with the greatest degree of stability
appearing in early to middle adulthood. We propose that one possible interpretation
of this result is that it indicates a role for cognitive control (i.e., the ability to adapt
cognition to current situations) in the construction of aesthetic taste, since cognitive
control performance follows a generally similar trajectory across the lifespan. However,
human aesthetic stability is on the whole rather low: even the most stable age groups
show ranking changes of at least 1 rank per item over a 2-week span. We discuss
possible implications for these findings in terms of existing theories of visual aesthetics
and in terms of methodological considerations, though we acknowledge that other
interpretations of our results are possible.
Keywords: empirical aesthetics, aesthetic stability, art perception, neuroaesthetics, vision, lifespan development
INTRODUCTION
How stable are human aesthetic preferences in general, and how does stability vary across the
lifespan? The answers to these questions may have a significant impact on our conception of
aesthetics. While philosophers (e.g., Hume, 1757;1987) have posited that stability in aesthetic
preference in general is a sign of sophistication, and while economists and social scientists have
studied population-level stability in preference for economic goods (e.g., Stigler and Becker, 1977)
and with regard to political questions (e.g., Druckman and Lupia, 2000), few studies have examined
any aspect of stability in aesthetic preference for art, music, or literature over time in individuals
(though we review what findings there are below).
Starting with the broader question regarding general levels of aesthetic stability in humans, we
note that measures of aesthetic stability bear on both the empirical question of how stable humans
tend to be, and also on the methodological question of whether single-trial tests of preference can
be considered reliable measures. The latter point echoes similar reevaluations of standard measures
of emotion and personality scales, as well as BOLD contrast measures, all of which appear to be
reliable at most at a level of 0.7, with typical reliability nearer to 0.5–0.6 (Vul et al., 2009).
With regard to aesthetic stability across the lifespan, folk theories tend to assume
that older adults are rather set in their ways. Likewise, parents may observe how
a young child’s tastes can become fixed. Adolescents and young adults, on the
other hand, are often characterized as inconstant. How accurate are these intuitions?
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This picture could be seen to accord with the notion that
adulthood is typified by negotiating among competing ecological
demands through short-term adaptation, whereas the very young
and old need not vary their cognitive set significantly over
time since they are protected from great change by the adult
population. Yet there may be reasons to expect that these
intuitions about the stability of taste could be wrong. An
alternative view holds that adulthood is a time when individuals
rely on heuristics to determine tastes, just as they do in their
habits. The young and the old, on the other hand, may have more
freedom to stray from heuristics (though possibly for different
reasons).
Past Work on the Stability of Visual
Aesthetics
Past psychophysical findings pertaining to the degree of stability
of human visual aesthetic preferences over time have been
generated incidentally to the pursuit of different questions; no
systematic studies exploring the stability of visual preferences
have been performed to our knowledge, and none has
examined stability in different age cohorts. We review past
findings here.
McManus (1980) examined the long-term stability of
preference for rectangles of different ratios and found rather
strong consistency of preference in four adult subjects over
the course of about 2 years. However, there were some
inconsistencies in how the test was administered on the two
time-separated trials. McManus et al. (2010) again studied
geometric shapes in nine adult subjects and found average
individual correlation values over roughly a 5-month span of
around 0.6–0.7. Hönekopp (2006) showed a re-test reliability
of 0.74 for ratings of face attractiveness over a 1-week
span in university students. Park et al. (2010) found that
artificially-induced shifts in individual preference within sets
of face and landscape stimuli were abolished after a 1-week
interval. Finally, Sadacca (1962) found that high school
students often showed higher consistency across tasks involving
preference and similarity (e.g., for color or verbal material)
during a single session than was found for a given task
performed twice in a 1-week span. However, this latter
study reported motivational problems that may have affected
results. Together, these incidental reports of human visual
aesthetic preferences do not constitute a systematic estimation
of aesthetic stability in the context of lifespan development nor
do they necessarily capture what is typical for adult aesthetic
preference.
Interestingly, research has shown that people with
Alzheimer’s Disease (AD)-related dementia—even those in
later stages of the disease—as well as people with frontotemporal
dementia (FTD) do not exhibit significantly different levels of
stability in aesthetic judgments of many types of paintings and
pictures, when these groups of individuals are compared to
each other and when they are compared to healthy age-matched
control groups (Halpern et al., 2008; Graham et al., 2013;
Halpern and O’Connor, 2013). This work has demonstrated
the potential for spared cognitive capacities via aesthetic tasks
in conditions that typically cause severe and broad cognitive
impairment, most notably in semantic memory. Indeed, this
research has also shown that patients with AD have substantially
worse explicit memory for images compared to controls,
as one would expect with a severe disorder like dementia.
The lack of significant differences between the groups with
dementia and controls in terms of aesthetic stability suggests
that explicit memory may not be a major contributor to
stability.
Cognitive Pragmatics and Cognitive
Control
What might we expect in terms of typical levels of visual
aesthetic stability over the lifespan? Following Craik and
Bialystok (2006), who reviewed two major trajectories of
cognition throughout the course of the human lifespan, we
might expect one of two possible trends. If aesthetic taste
exhibits crystallized characteristics—that is, those that involve
the accrual of knowledge and experience—our tastes would tend
to rapidly become more fixed in early childhood, then increase
more slowly but still monotonically into older adulthood, and
decline only at the end of life. This outcome could be seen
to imply that aesthetic stability is related to representational
knowledge, or ‘‘cognitive pragmatics’’ (Craik and Bialystok,
2006). If, on the other hand aesthetic taste is related to
cognitive control (i.e., the ability to adapt cognition to current
situations) we would expect a trajectory in aesthetic stability
with age that matches that of cognitive control. In particular,
we would expect a more peaked, unimodal (inverted U-shaped)
function. This result could imply that human aesthetics depends
fundamentally on our ability to adapt cognitive processes to a
given situation, and to maintain heuristics (what we term an
‘‘aesthetic construction’’) over long periods. This result could
be seen as inconsistent with the notion that an individual’s
aesthetic preferences depend solely or mostly on the accrual
of knowledge and experience. We note that the present study
attempts in a general way to determine which of these
trajectories is most similar to empirical results for aesthetic
stability; however, such potential correspondences do not rule
out other explanations for the lifespan trajectory of aesthetic
stability.
Here we investigated chronological age-related differences
in the stability of visual preference in a cross-sectional study
across the lifespan. We collected ranked preference data and
memory data for images of painted artwork and photographs
depicting the same faces and natural scenes in participants
of chronological age 3–99. It should be noted that we are
investigating the stability of individuals’ tastes over time, not
the idiosyncrasies of individual taste. In previous work, it
has been shown that, despite somewhat greater agreement
among individuals about landscape images compared to abstract
ones, individuals have idiosyncratic tastes whose origins are
not well understood (Vessel and Rubin, 2010; Leder et al.,
2016). We likewise assume here that tastes vary widely
among individuals, but for reasons we do not attempt to
discern.
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FIGURE 1 | Examples of stimuli used in the experiment. See Supplementary
Material for image metadata.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Overview
We employed a ranking task and an explicit memory task with
image stimuli to test humans across the lifespan. We performed
a cross-sectional study of stability in preschool and early
elementary school children, adolescents, college-age students and
adults. The procedure was the same as in Graham et al. (2013).
Participants were asked to rank four sets of eight printed stimuli
based on their individual aesthetic preference (see Figure 1 for
examples of stimuli, and SupplementaryMaterial for images of all
stimuli). Twoweeks later, they were asked to repeat the same task.
In addition, participants were tested on explicit memory during
the second experimental session, prior to the aesthetic stability
task. In the explicit memory task, four images in each stimulus
set were presented in sequence paired with a distractor image and
participants were asked which they had seen before.
The data from the present study were combined with
previously collected data for healthy elderly participants in
Graham et al. (2013), which were collected using the same images
and methodology. All research was conducted in accordance
with ethical standards established by the Declaration of Helsinki;
written and informed consent was obtained from all participants
or their legal guardians, and all phases of the study were approved
by the Institutional Review Board at Hobart and William Smith
Colleges or the University of Vienna Ethics Committee.
Participants
Young Children
Participants were recruited from four day-care facilities in
Geneva, NY, USA: Discovery’s Playground; Roots and Shoots;
Geneva Lakefront Childcare Center; and Geneva General
Hospital Child Care Center. Children were given permission to
participate through written and informed consent of caregivers
and through authorization of all programs involved. There were
22 participants (28.9% of total sample; 13 female) age 3–9
(M = 6.20, SD = 2.08). This group was further subdivided
into younger children age 3–6 (N = 13, M = 4.70) and
older children age 7–9 (N = 9, M = 8.33). There were
no incentives given to participants, guardians, or child-care
facilities.
Adolescents
Participants age 11–16 (14.5% of total sample; 3 female, N = 11,
M = 13.9, SD = 2.07) were recruited from the Boys andGirls Club,
Geneva, NY, USA. Participants gave verbal assent, and were
given permission to participate through written and informed
consent of caregivers and through authorization of the Boys and
Girls Club. Participants were given a small item (toy sunglasses,
lanyard, etc.) as an incentive. There were no incentives given to
guardians or the Boys and Girls Club.
Undergraduates
Participants age 20–22 (21.1% of total sample; 9 female, N = 16,
M = 21.1, SD = 0.62) were recruited from the undergraduate
research participant pool at Hobart and William Smith Colleges
in return for course credit. All subjects provided written and
informed consent.
Adults Age 30+
Participants age 30 and older (15.8% of total sample; 8 female,
N = 12,M = 40.8, SD = 9.92) were recruited from the campus of
Hobart and William Smith Colleges and the Geneva, NY, USA
community in return for a small item (mug, thumb-drive, etc.).
All subjects provided written and informed consent.
Elderly
We reanalyzed data collected in Graham et al. (2013)
involving healthy older adults in Vienna, Austria, comprising
15 participants (19.7% of total sample; 10 female) with an average
age of 74.2 (SD = 13.2). All participants provided written and
informed consent and no incentives were given.
Stimuli
In previous work, Graham et al. (2013) focused on two
additional questions pertaining to stimulus level effects with
regard to aesthetic stability: (1) Whether handmade (painted)
stimuli would produce greater aesthetic stability than other
images in the AD group? and (2) What the role of image
content, specifically faces, plays in patients with AD? To achieve
this, Graham et al. (2013) assembled a stimulus set in the
domains of portraiture and landscape painting matched for
content with corresponding photographs. Results indicated that
only photographs of faces showed significant decreases in
stability for the AD group vs. controls, an effect consistent
with the possibility of interference from disease-affected face
processing systems. Halpern et al. (2008) and Halpern and
O’Connor (2013) used three classes of artwork (representational,
abstract and quasi-representational) in testing AD and FTD
patients, but found only minor stimulus class-related effects.
The current work continues the investigation of stimulus-level
effects.
The stimuli included four sets of eight images: ‘‘painted
landscape’’, ‘‘landscape photo’’, ‘‘painted portrait’’ and ‘‘portrait
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photo’’. Images were all of recognizable content and were
painted in representational styles including Romanticism,
Impressionism and Realism. Photographs depicted the
same content as the paintings (i.e., same identity as the
portrait, or same geographical location as the landscape).
Images were culled from Internet sources and books (e.g.,
Machotka, 1996). See Supplementary Material for images of
stimuli.
Explicit Memory Task
In the explicit memory task, four previously viewed images
in each image class (16 total) were paired with distractors in
a two-alternative forced-choice task. Participants were asked
which image they had seen before. Distractors were painted by
the same artist as the target (in the case of painted images),
or depicted similar landscapes. Distractor face/portrait images
were the same gender and approximate age as those shown in
the corresponding target images. See Supplementary Material for
images of distractor stimuli.
Procedure
First, participants ranked the four sets of stimuli. The sets were
presented in random order, and the eight stimuli in a given set
were arranged on a table in front of the participants in random
order. Subjects were asked to create a ranking of the stimuli from
‘‘least favorite’’ to ‘‘most favorite’’. Participants were told that
there was no time limit and that there was no wrong way to rank
the stimuli.
Two weeks (14 days) later, participants were given the explicit
memory task. Following the memory task, subjects were asked
to repeat the rank preference task in the same manner as in the
previous session 2 weeks prior.
RESULTS
In order to calculate how stable an individual’s aesthetic
preferences were, we analyzed the per-item numerical change of
stimulus rank between session one and session two. The resulting
change score ranges from a low score of 0 (no change) to a
high score of 4 (each image rank different). This calculation
is essentially the L1 norm (city-block distance) between two
sets of rankings made by a given individual for a given task,
when considering each set of rankings as a vector in the
eight-dimensional orthogonal vector space of stimulus items.
The change score was then subtracted from 4 to give an
aesthetic stability index, or for simplicity, we call this aesthetic
stability. This inversion of the scale serves to represent data in
terms of how stable participants are, rather than how unstable
they are.
In order to rule out the possibility of random guessing for
the preference task, a simulation of 100,000 pairs of random
preference rankings was created to measure the average stability
value at chance. This value, 1.37, which represents the centroid of
the vector space, was compared to the average preference value
for each participant group. One-sample t-tests confirmed that
younger children (M = 1.94, SD = 0.61), t(12) = 3.36, p < 0.01,
older children (M = 2.80, SD = 0.40), t(8) = 10.67, p < 0.001,
adolescents (M = 2.68, SD = 0.40), t(10) = 10.83, p < 0.001,
undergraduates (M = 2.93, SD = 0.22), t(15) = 28.44, p < 0.001,
adults (M = 2.79, SD = 0.34), t(11) = 14.62, p< 0.001, and elderly
individuals (M = 2.31, SD = 0.47), t(14) = 7.81, p < 0.001, all
performed well above chance.
These summary results indicate that on average, even the
most stable group—undergraduates—experienced a change in
aesthetic preference of at least one rank per item across all image
classes, while young children showed on average more than two
rank changes per item; see Table 1.
Figure 2A shows the overall change score for each of the six
participant groups. Differences in stability as a function of age
were analyzed using a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA).
Results showed a significant effect of participant group on change
score at the p < 0.05 level, F(5,70) = 10.74, p < 0.001. Post hoc
analyses using the Scheffé criterion for significance indicated that
children ages 3–6 (M = 1.94 SD = 0.61) showed significantly
lower stability than children ages 7–9 (M = 2.80, SD = 0.40),
adolescents (M = 2.68, SD = 0.40), undergraduates (M = 2.93,
SD = 0.22), and adults (M = 2.79, SD = 0.34). Similarly, elderly
individuals (M = 2.31, SD = 0.47) showed significantly lower
stability in comparison to undergraduates, adolescents, or adults
(but not to younger or older children). Figure 2B shows all
participants’ results as a function of age, along with a fit that
demonstrates a significant quadratic relationship (R2 = 0.189,
p< 0.01). This result suggests an inverted U-shaped relationship
with age: aesthetic stability tends to increase with age until
early adulthood, where it begins to decreases gradually until the
end of life.
Figure 3 shows mean aesthetic stability values for each
participant group as a function of age, organized by image
type/category (i.e., landscape paintings, landscape photos,
portrait paintings and portrait photos). Stability as a function
of each stimulus category was also analyzed using a series
of one-way ANOVAs. Of particular interest are the mean
differences in each of the six participant groups’ change score
TABLE 1 | Descriptive statistics for memory performance and stability across both age group and image category, as well as stability results for each stimulus group.
N Mean (SD) Range Skewness (SE)
Total recall rate (%) 76 0.883 (0.161) 0.67 −1.72 (0.276)
Total stability 76 2.56 (0.539) 2.25 −0.766 (0.276)
Landscape painting stability 75 2.65 (0.687) 3.25 −0.651 (0.277)
Landscape photo stability 75 2.47 (0.819) 3.25 −0.458 (0.277)
Portrait painting stability 73 2.61 (0.672) 3.00 −0.496 (0.281)
Portrait photo stabilty 75 2.58 (0.651) 3.00 −0.836 (0.277)
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FIGURE 2 | (A) Aesthetic stability values as a function of age averaged across stimulus groups plotted by age group. (B) The same data for all participants along
with associated quadratic fit and fit parameters. Error bars are given in standard error (SE).
when comparing landscape paintings and photos to portrait
paintings and photos.
For landscape paintings, results showed a significant effect
of participant group on change score, F(5,69) = 7.88, p < 0.001.
Post hoc analyses using the Scheffé criterion for significance
showed that children ages 3–6 (M = 2.01, SD = 0.73) were
significantly less stable than children ages 7–9 (M = 3.12,
SD = 0.50), adolescents (M = 2.91, SD = 0.39), undergraduates
(M = 2.8, SD = 0.30) and adults (M = 3.06, SD = 0.57).
Elderly individuals (M = 2.25, SD = 0.74) were also less stable
than children ages 7–9 and adults. Similar effects were also
observed for landscape photographs, F(5,69) = 5.95, p < 0.001.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 5 May 2017 | Volume 11 | Article 289
Pugach et al. Aesthetic Stability Across the Lifespan
FIGURE 3 | Aesthetic stability values as a function of age group by stimulus group. (A) Landscape paintings; (B) landscape photos; (C) portrait paintings; (D) portrait
photos. Associated quadratic fits are also shown, along with fit parameters. Error bars are given in SE.
Post hoc analyses showed that both children age 3–6 (M = 1.71,
SD = 0.90) and elderly individuals (M = 2.08, SD = 0.79) were
significantly less stable than undergraduate students (M = 3.00,
SD = 0.58).
In comparison, effects of participant group on change score
were less prominent for both portrait paintings (F(5,67) = 3.03,
p = 0.02) and portrait photographs (F(5,69) = 3.46, p = 0.01).
Post hoc analyses indicated that, for portrait paintings, children
ages 3–6 (M = 2.14, SD = 0.85) were significantly less stable
than undergraduates (M = 3.02, SD = 0.54). Similarly, for
portrait photographs, children ages 3–6 (M = 2.05, SD = 0.72)
were significantly less stable than undergraduates (M = 2.92,
SD = 0.48). Thus, fewer mean differences in stability were
found across all age groups for portrait paintings and photos
in comparison to landscape paintings and photos, though
the trajectory of stability of face images as a function
of age broadly matches what is observed for landscape
images.
An independent samples t-test also showed no significant
differences in the stability scores of males (M = 1.55, SD = 0.56)
and females (M = 1.36, SD = 0.51), t(74) = 1.54, p = 0.13.
Explicit Memory
Table 2 shows the recall rate (% correct), or explicit memory,
for each group of participants. A one-way ANOVA showed
a significant effect of participant group on explicit memory,
F(5,70) = 7.37, p < 0.001. Post hoc analyses using the
Scheffé criterion for significance showed that children ages 3–6
(M = 0.76, SD = 0.23) recalled significantly less information
than children ages 7–9 (M = 0.97, SD = 0.03), adolescents
(M = 0.95, SD = 0.03), undergraduates (M = 0.94, SD = 0.11),
and adults (M = 0.96, SD = 0.06). Similarly, elderly individuals
(M = 0.76, SD = 0.17) performed significantly more poorly than
older children, adolescents, undergraduates and adults.
Each group’s memory task results were compared to chance
performance (0.50) in order to rule out the possibility of random
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TABLE 2 | Memory performance (recall rate, %) in each age group (with standard
error).
Participant group Recall rate % (SE)
Younger children 76.2 (6.5)
Older children 97.3 (1.0)
Adolescents 94.9 (0.9)
Undergraduates 93.7 (2.7)
Adults 96.1 (1.6)
Elderly 75.8 (4.2)
guessing. One-sample t-tests showed that younger children
(M = 0.76, SD = 0.23), t(12) = 4.01, p < 0.01, older children
(M = 0.97, SD = 0.03), t(8) = 44.06, p < 0.001, adolescents
(M = 0.95, SD = 0.03), t(10) = 46.64, p < 0.001, undergraduates
(M = 0.94, SD = 0.11), t(15) = 16.45, p < 0.001, adults (M = 0.96,
SD = 0.06), t(11) = 27.47, p < 0.001, and elderly individuals
(M = 0.76, SD = 0.17), t(14) = 6.1, p < 0.001, all performed
significantly better than chance.
We note that explicit memory performance in our study
should not necessarily be thought of as a correlate of the strength
of cognitive pragmatics (crystallized processes) in an individual
since the information presented during the experiment was new
to the participants.
While aesthetic stability and memory performance are
significantly correlated (p < 0.01, R2 = 0.236; see Figure 4),
further analysis suggests a divergence (though not necessarily
a dissociation) between memory performance and aesthetic
stability as a function of age. In particular, memory performance
as a function of the logarithm of age is well fit by a fourth
order (even symmetric) polynomial: the data show a sharp
rise in early childhood, a broad plateau through later life, and
sharp fall at the end of life. This accords with the notion
that cognitive pragmatics remain relatively constant throughout
adulthood, declining only towards the end of life when cognitive
access (e.g., lexical access, which we note is in part a function
FIGURE 4 | Correlation of memory performance (% correct) and aesthetic
stability for each participant, with linear fit and fit parameters.
FIGURE 5 | (A) Correlation of the logarithm of age vs. memory performance
(% correct) fitted with a 4th order (even-symmetric) polynomial. (B) Correlation
of the logarithm of age vs. aesthetic stability fitted with a 3rd order
(odd-symmetric) polynomial.
of cognitive control) falls off. Aesthetic stability, on the other
hand, is well fit as a function of the logarithm of age by a
third order (odd symmetric) polynomial that peaks around
age 17, with gradual fall off in younger and older people (see
Figure 5).
We note also that the correlation between aesthetic stability
and memory performance was lower when considering each
image class separately. Values of R2 for landscape paintings,
landscape photos, portrait paintings and portrait photos were
0.20 (p< 0.001), 0.11 (p< 0.01), 0.0005 (n.s.), and 0.06 (p< 0.05),
respectively.
An independent samples t-test also revealed that across the
entire sample, males (M = 0.91, SD = 0.13) did not differ from
females (M = 0.86, SD = 0.51) in their explicit memory scores,
t(74) = 1.48, p = 0.14.
Spearman Correlation Analysis
In order to make our results comparable to other studies of the
reliability of experimental measures in psychology, we reanalyzed
our full data using a Spearman correlation analysis of rankings in
sessions 1 and 2 for all participants. This measure has a simpler
scale from 0 (uncorrelated rankings) to 1 (identical rankings)
compared to the aesthetic stability index; however, we note that
because Spearman is an approximation and aesthetic stability
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is an exact measure, we chose to use the latter in our main
analysis in this article. Moreover, aesthetic stability is readily and
intuitively interpretable in terms of rank changes per item.
The grand mean of Spearman ρ values across all participants
and stimuli was 0.27. The value was somewhat higher when
considering the grand mean of the magnitude of ρ (0.35).
However, p values in this analysis were only occasionally less
than 0.05 (about 13% of all pairs of rankings). Considered along
with results from McManus (1980), McManus et al. (2010),
and Hönekopp (2006), our results suggest that the reliability of
preference judgments falls off rapidly over the scale of days.
Consistency of Preference for Matched
Content
Given that the content of landscape paintings was matched
with landscape photographs, and given that the content of
portrait paintings was matched with portrait photographs,
we also investigated the consistency of each participant
in their rankings for these two corresponding stimulus
categories.
Data were analyzed using an identical methodology as was
used for calculating change scores, where we analyzed each
participant’s per item numerical change of stimulus rank between
matched landscape paintings and landscape photos, and between
matched portrait paintings and portrait photos. Results were
calculated for both session one and session two, yielding a total
of four scores. As with the change score, a low score of 0
represented no change and a score of 4 indicated each image
rank changed maximally. Scores were then subtracted from 4 to
represent the degree to which matched landscape stimuli and
matched portrait stimuli were ranked consistently (rather than
inconsistently).
Results showed that for session 1, the mean consistency
score for matched landscape stimuli was 1.99 (SD = 0.78)
and for matched portrait stimuli was 1.57 (SD = 0.63). For
session two, the mean consistency score for matched landscape
stimuli was 2.19 (SD = 0.76) and for matched portrait stimuli
was 1.62 (SD = 0.77). A paired samples t-test comparing
consistency scores of matched landscape stimuli across sessions
did not yield significant differences (t(72) = 1.60, p = 0.11).
Similarly, a paired samples t-test comparing consistency scores
of matched portrait stimuli across sessions was not significant
(t(71) = 0.51, p = 0.61).
These results could be viewed in at least two ways: first as
a ‘‘memory-free’’ measure of test-retest reliability. From this
perspective, our results would appear to confirm that humans
are rather inconsistent in their preferences even for tasks with
matched content presented in the same session. Alternatively
(or in addition), these results could be seen to highlight the
highly idiosyncratic nature of aesthetic preference even within
individuals.
DISCUSSION
We find that humans of all ages have relatively little consistency
in their aesthetic preferences over a 2-week span, despite
performing well above chance in all age groups. Younger adults
showed the highest aesthetic stability.
These results indicate that humans on the whole are
changeable in their tastes, even over a relatively short time span;
inconsistencies among stimuli with matched content reinforce
this interpretation.
These findings also agree with past work on non-human
primates showing marked inconsistency in preference for visual
patterns across short intervals (Rensch, 1957). Thus, we urge
caution in the interpretation of studies of aesthetic preference
that collect participant rankings or ratings in a single time trial,
and we encourage researchers to begin to consider new ways
of taking account of these results. Moreover, lower stability
values for humans below age 10 and beyond age 65 suggest that
additional caution should be exercised in drawing conclusions
from single-trial studies in these populations.
On the other hand, previous results showing spared aesthetic
stability in people with dementia (Halpern et al., 2008; Graham
et al., 2013; Halpern and O’Connor, 2013) suggests that human
aesthetics could be more deeply engrained in an individual’s
cognition than is implied by the stability of humans in general.
Lifespan Aesthetic Stability
Contrary to popular stereotypes, our results also indicate that
human tastes tend to be most stable in early- to mid-adulthood,
and substantially lower in childhood and late adulthood.
We suggest here that our results are consistent with the idea
that, at their cognitive root, aesthetic preferences are in part a
function of cognitive control, since this trait is maximal in early
adulthood, and substantially lower in youth and later adulthood
(Craik and Bialystok, 2006).
In other words, adults may display more consistent tastes
because they are better able to maintain stable heuristics
concerning what they prefer. In terms of the psychology of
aesthetics, this would imply that human aesthetics could be
a construction that must be maintained over time. As such,
one’s accumulated knowledge (i.e., one’s crystallized knowledge,
or one’s store of memories and associations)—which peaks in
late adulthood, and only declines substantially near the end
of life—may play less of a role in aesthetics than is often
assumed.
As noted earlier, Sadacca (1962) found that an individual’s
characteristic stability appears to emerge in a variety of
judgments (preference, similarity) and stimulus types (colors,
verbal material). These findings support the notion that changes
in stability are broad-based and thus potentially rooted in core
cognitive processes. In addition, it suggests that our results may
apply to other types of stimuli besides images.
Implications for Existing Aesthetic
Frameworks
Understanding the trajectory of aesthetic stability across the
lifespan also helps us develop a better understanding of how
aesthetic preferences form, and it provides a new perspective
from which to evaluate existing frameworks in the psychology
of aesthetics.
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One of the most striking conclusions from our results
is that it may be difficult to distinguish aesthetic universals
from individual differences in aesthetics, since humans overall
appear to be rather changeable. Moreover, to the extent
that an individual’s aesthetic construction aligns with putative
universals, it may be difficult to determine whether this is due
to the aesthetic ‘‘pull’’ of universals, or due to the fact that an
individual has constructed an aesthetics that aligns with these
universals.
If preferences are shaped by a kind of heuristic aesthetic
construction that requires a degree of cognitive control in order
to be maintained over time, several existing proposals may
require reappraisal.
Some (Bullot and Reber, 2013; see also Graham, 2013) argue
that substantial historical and critical context is a prerequisite
for the aesthetic appreciation of any work of art. Since general
representational knowledge of this kind peaks in late adulthood,
we might infer that—all else being equal—older adults should
be more stable in their preferences compared to younger
people, who have less accumulated knowledge. Although we
did not measure appreciation in this study, we did find that
stability peaks earlier in life, which calls into question the role
of representational knowledge in the formation of aesthetic
preference.
Other researchers argue that some aspects of visual aesthetics
could be innately linked to evolutionary goals related to ecology
(see e.g., Vessel and Rubin, 2010; see also Rodway et al., 2016).
However, our finding that young children are highly unstable
in their preferences for landscapes and landscape paintings
complicates the idea that natural scenes show more innate
patterns of preference when compared to, for example, abstract
art. Indeed, if certain kinds of landscapes are innately preferred,
we should see these biases consistently from early childhood
onward. Instead, we find that young peoples’ preferences are
much more changeable than adult preferences.
Our data show change between childhood and adulthood in
the stability of preference for faces and portrait paintings. These
results suggest that innate aesthetic biases for face attributes
(e.g., for symmetry or averageness) may be relatively weak;
this finding is in line with a recent twin study showing
far more variation in face preference judgments between
monozygotic twins than is expected given the twins’ highly
similar performance on measures of face recognition (Germine
et al., 2015). These researchers argue that their results suggest
environmental effects are at work; that is, each twin could see
a different set of faces over the lifespan, which could shape
individual taste. But given that identical twins often develop
in similar environments, this result may instead be seen as a
by-product of the diverse and changeable aesthetic constructions
that adults create, which may or may not depend on differential
environments.
Some in experimental aesthetics argue that aesthetics—at least
with regard to fine art—requires sophisticated problem-solving
abilities, for example to extract predictable visual forms in an
uncertain visual environment (Van de Cruys and Wagemans,
2011; Muth and Carbon, 2013). But to the extent that humans
appreciate this kind of problem solving or pattern-comparison
task, this suggestion may be more parsimoniously explained as
a kind of aesthetic task that adults are most well suited to. In
other words, the apparent aesthetic reward for ‘‘figuring out’’
a painting or musical work may be just one of many aesthetic
constructions that adult human viewers—and artists—can create.
One may also consider that this kind of aesthetic construction
might be particular to university-educated research participants.
Manipulating Aesthetics
Given our results showing relatively low consistency in taste
across time, we are prompted to ask what conditions are
necessary for changing human aesthetic response, as has been
done in the study of social attitudes and choices (e.g., prospect
theory; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979 or Strack and Schwarz,
2007). One avenue for approaching this question in aesthetics
is to examine the role of novelty and familiarity. Park et al.
(2010) conducted a study involving visual exposure to a
variety of stimuli including faces, natural scenes, and geometric
figures. They found that the young adult participants preferred
familiarity for stimuli involving faces while for stimuli involving
natural scenes novelty was preferred. However, these artificially
induced shifts in preference were abolished after a 1-week
interval, with subjects returning to patterns of preference like
those that occurred before the manipulation.
Work by Pelli and Vale (2014) has begun to study
manipulations that are capable of changing observer aesthetic
response on shorter timescales. However, changing aesthetic
preferences over long periods in adults may be difficult to achieve
given low ‘‘baseline’’ stability. We therefore encourage further
work in this vein.
Clinical Implications
In terms of geriatric clinical practice, it may be the case that when
an individual’s aesthetic taste becomes quite inconsistent across
stimulus types or tasks, this could be an indication of deficits or
disturbances in neural components underlying cognitive control.
Such disturbances might not be uncovered in tests of memory
performance or in single-trial tests of cognitive control processes.
Aesthetic judgment tasks may also be less burdensome to elders
than existing cognitive assessments. However, more work is
needed to elucidate potential applications of this kind.
Caveats
We note that the phased nature of the experiment was such
that some participants received small incentives for their
participation while others did not. We believe this is at most
a minor flaw because the task does not have a single correct
response, and participants were well informed about this fact.
Indeed, they were not aware that the second session would
re-test preference for images from the first session. It remains
possible—but unlikely in our view—that participants could
suspect that concordant rankings in the two sessions was the
desired response.
In addition, we note that the elderly participants were
from Austria while participants from other age groups were
from the USA. However, both Austria and the USA are
considered W.E.I.R.D. (western, educated, industrialized, rich,
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and democratic; see Henrich et al., 2010) and though there
is some work showing systematic differences in aesthetic
judgments between Eastern and Western viewers (e.g., Bao
et al., 2016), we are not aware of studies showing differences in
aesthetic judgments between two W.E.I.R.D. cultures. Nor are
we aware of studies showing systematic differences in aesthetic
judgments due to socioeconomic status or other demographic
factors we did not control for. In any case, because there
was no difference in stability between males and females,
we believe demographic factors exerted little or no influence
on the results.
We also note that it is possible that other measures of aesthetic
preference may produce different levels of stability. However,
we chose to use rank order preference since this measure could
be administered easily to all age groups and is less prone to
bias than, for example, ratings. If aesthetic ratings are indeed
more stable, this could be due in part to methodological biases
in rating studies causing more uniformity in preference, and
therefore greater likelihood of stability. In any case, Hönekopp
(2006) also found rather low aesthetic stability, as noted above,
using ratings of faces over just half the timespan used in the
current study. We therefore believe other methodologies for
measuring preference will show similar levels of stability as those
used here.
Alternative Interpretations
We acknowledge that alternative interpretations of our data are
possible. First, it is possible that stimulus diversity could be a
factor. In particular, humans may be more stable for sets of
images that are more heterogeneous than those used in the
current study. However, diversity is difficult to quantify since
it depends on photometric as well as semantic information.
In any case, our experiment affords us an opportunity to
examine stability for image classes of different relative levels
of diversity: in particular, we find essentially the same patterns
of stability across age for relatively homogenous image classes
(e.g., photographs of faces) and for more heterogeneous classes
(landscape photographs and paintings).
It is also possible that our memory data show a ceiling
effect, which may have made the correlation between memory
and stability somewhat less than it is. However, while our
data do not show statistical independence between memory
and stability, they do suggest that memory performance alone
does not explain the stability results (especially when considered
for each stimulus class individually). Moreover, it is known
that intact explicit memory is not required for aesthetic
stability, as shown in people with dementia (Halpern et al.,
2008; Graham et al., 2013; Halpern and O’Connor, 2013). In
addition, the fact that stability even for the youngest and oldest
participants in our study is well above chance suggests that all
participants had at least some fixed (albeit idiosyncratic) criteria
for making aesthetic judgments. Future work will aim to test
causal links between cognitive control and aesthetic judgment
using explicit assessments of both constructs at different age
points.
CONCLUSION
We found that human taste is rather unstable at all stages of
life: aesthetic preferences are quite unstable in early childhood;
become increasingly stable in young adulthood; and then
gradually become less stable in later adulthood. As such, our
results refute the popular impression that young adults are
fickle while children and older adults are set in their ways.
Our results are consistent with the idea that human aesthetics
is rooted in cognitive control, and we propose the notion of
an ‘‘aesthetic construction’’, or a heuristic that guides human
aesthetic judgment.While our results do not constitute proof that
cognitive control and heuristics underlie aesthetic judgment, they
do suggest that this idea warrants further study. We conclude
that the study of aesthetic stability provides new perspectives
in the fields of empirical aesthetics and neuroaesthetics because
it may point to new ways of understanding of aesthetics in
terms of core cognitive systems. However, the general instability
of human taste over relatively short timespans suggests a need
for reevaluation of existing frameworks and methodologies in
empirical aesthetics.
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